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THE VOLUNTARY ADJUSTMENT OF RAILROAD
OBLIGATIONS
HUBERT L. Wua.*
The enactment during the first session of the 76th Congress of Chapter XV of
the Bankruptcy Act providing for "Railroad Adjustments" has attracted new and
widespread attention to what in the past decade has been a relatively unimportant
aspect of railroad financial tactics, the so-called "voluntary" adjustment or reorganiza-
tion.
In the one hundred odd years in which the railroads have been a significant part
of the American scene, over half of them have at one time or another undergone
a capital overhauling. Before the passage of Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act the
typical railroad reorganization Was accomplished through an equity receivership
which ctstomarily terminated in foreclosure proceedings and the transfer of the
road's assets to a new corporation. Not infrequently, however, the receivership ended
with most of the creditors and security holders of the old corporation accepting a
plan of reorganization, thus obviating the necessity for foreclosure and the creation
of a new corporation.
This represented one type of voluntary reorganization though often it differed
from a so-called "involuntary" one only in the omission of foreclosure, one of many
pressure devices used to obtain acceptance of a plan. Since either proceedingfunc-
tioned typically through committees which usually held blanket authorizations to
bind the owners of deposited securities to any plan approved by the committee, there
was little that was truly voluntary about such a reorganization even in the absence
of foreclosure. To the average security holder the method of terminating the receiver-
ship mattered little, for having deposited his securities with a committe he was fore-
closed from any further voluntary action in the proceedings. Of course, even when
foreclosure was omitted, the threat thereof served frequently as a more than adequate
substitute.
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The other type of voluntary adjustment was accomplished without resort to the
courts. The management prepared a plan and sought to induce all affected creditors
and security holders to accept its proposal. Often such plans were effected without
the formation of any committees. Frequently, too, these originally voluntary pro-
cedings became involuntary through conversion into what was known as a "short
receivership."4
The principal weakness of both types of voluntary proceedings from the point
of view of the management was that unless substantially all affected security holders
and creditors had either deposited with friendly committees or could be induced
separately to accept the plan, a real problem of handling dissenters was presented.
Among the advantages were the avoidance of foreclosure and the problems attendant
thereon and the preservation of the old corporation. 5
With the shift in attitude toward corporate reorganization and financing evi-
denced in part by the enactment of such statutes as Sections 77, 77B and Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Actn as well as the Securities and Securities Exchange Acts,
equity receiverships fell into decline and the first type of voluntary reorganization
became extinct. The attempts at negotiations between the management representing
the stockholders and the creditors without resort to any court proceedings continued,
however, hindered always by the problem of handling dissenters.
Among the railroads such voluntary adjustments were limited almost exclusively
to effecting the extension of single issue maturities and did not involve any large-
scale capital adjustments8 Even these single issue extensions were carried through
only with great difficulty because of the absence of any effective method of dealing
with dissenters short of purchasing their securities.
It was somewhat surprising, therefore, when, in the fall of 1938, voluntary plans
affecting most of the outstanding indebtedness of each road were presented for both
'The "short receivership," strenuously criticized in the S. E. C.'s Protective Committee Study, was
surprisingly similar to the procedure authorized by Chapter XV. See S. E. C., RsPoRTs on man Sivow MW
sN-VSOAToN OF ma WORK, Acrsvzrsas, PERSONNEL, AND Fu noNs OF PRoTEacIVE AND raOxRC nxAIoN
COM nFrrrs, Pt. ], p. 312 et seq. See also the Commission's letter to Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Hearings
of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H. R. 5407, 7 6th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 62 (hercin-
after cited as "Senate Hearings").
' Preservation of the existing corporation may be desirable for several reasons. The cost of organizing
a new corporation may be considerable, e.g., it was estimated that it would cost the Rock Island $Booooo
to organize a new corporation and qualify it to do business in Illinois and Iowa. See Hearings of the
Special Subcommittee on Ban kruptcy and Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciaty, on
S. t869, 7 6th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) Pt. 1, p. 458. The legislative charters granted many roads, e.,
the B. & 0., contain desirable provisions which make retention of the charter advantageous
" S77, as amended, is U. S. C. A. §2o5 (1939); 577B, as amended, i U. S. C. A. 5207 (1937);
Chapter X, ii U. S. C. A. SS5oI-676 (1939).
TSecurities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. S57 7 b-bbbb (Supp. 1939); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 895 (x934), 15 U. S. C. A. SS78a-jj (Supp. 1939).
' One of the few large-scale plans attempted was that for the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad which
was presented originally as a straight voluntary plan to be effected without court proceedings. The road
subsequently went into equity receivership in the hope of carrying out the plan through a "short receiver-
ship." This was abandoned in 1933 and a petition filed under S77 of the Bankruptcy Act. See S. E. C,
RapoRar, supra note 4, at 318 c: seq.
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the Lehigh Valley9 and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Companies,10 and projected
plans for several other roads were rumored to be under consideration. Both the plans
referred to contained provisions substantially similar to those in the B. & 0. plan
providing that assents thereto were to be binding in proceedings under Section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act "or other law at the time in force, or through such other legal
proceedings as the Board of Directors may deem appropriate to effectuate the Plan
as to non-assenting minorities."'
The ambiguity contained in the reference to "other law" was cleared up early in
the first session of the 7 6th Congress with the introduction in the House of Repre-
sentatives of H. R. 3704, proposing the addition to the Bankruptcy Act of Chapter
XV to provide for "Railroad Adjustments."' 2
While the proposed procedure contemplated no committees, so that it would still
be necessary to obtain individual acceptance of the plan by creditors and security
holders, the more important problem of dissenters was solved by empowering the
bankruptcy court, upon the acceptance of the plan by a specified minimum of
security holders and creditors, to bind all parties including dissenters thereto. On
July 28, 1939, after considerable amendment and with a time limitation of one year
imposed, Chapter XV became law.
Pursuant to this time limitation, the present Chapter XV expires July 31, 1940.
Since latest indications are that it will not be extended, no attempt will be here made
to analyze its specific provisions. On the other hand there will be few, if any, large-
scale voluntary plans effected in the future unless some similar method of binding
dissenters is provided. An examination of the Chapter XV procedure and plans will
be useful, therefore, in determining both whether new legislation is desirable and,
if so, what form it should take.
TmE PocEDURE
Virtually all recent corporate reorganization legislation 3 as well as the new rail-
road reorganization bill now before Congress14 has been designed to afford all in-
terested parties, the court and the appropriate governmental agencies a full oppor-
tunity to examine the corporation involved and all proposals for its reorganization.
Chapter XV, however, presents a procedure quite the reverse. Not only is there but--
one plan, that proposed by the management, but the procedure is so geared that
* Dated Aug. 25, 1938, 230 I. C. C. 685 (1938).
'*Dated Aug. 5, 1938, 230 1. C. C. 243 (1938), 29 F. Supp. 6o8 (D. Md. 1939), cert. denied, 6o
Sup. Ct. 470 (1940). The material sent to security holders is also reproduced in Senate Hearings, x17
et seq. ld. at a8.
" H. R. 3704 was subsequently reintroduced in amended form as H. R. 5407 which, as further
amended, finally became law.
" 577; S77B; Chapter X. With respect to the safeguards provided by Chapter X and their absence
in Chapter XV, the following language of the Supreme Court, while reating to Chapter XI, is equally
applicable to Chapter XV: "'No comparable safeguards are found in Chapter XL. Every phase of the
procedure bearing on the administration of the estate and the development of the arrangement is under
the control of the debtor. The process of formulating an arrangement and the solicitation of consent of
creditors, sacrifices to speed and economy every safeguard, in the interest of thoroughness and disinterested-
ness, provided in Chapter X." S. E. C. v. U. S. Realty Improvement Co., 6o Sup. C. ZOA (1940).
", H. R. 9447, 7 6th Cong., 3d Ses. (x939).
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neither the I. C. C. nor the bankruptcy court, the only disinterested agencies possess-
ing jurisdiction, can effectively examine this plan and perform the protective func-
tions delegated to it. Most of the safeguards necessary to insure an economically
sound as well as a fair plan are sacrificed to permit a speedy proceeding.
The initial step in the procedure is for the management of a railroad faced- with
principal or interest maturities which it cannot meet to formulate a so-called "plan
of adjustment."15 The next step is to obtain acceptance of this management distress
plan by as many of the affected creditors and security holders as possible. To this
end a vigorous solicitation is begun in which the plan is presented as persuasively as
the proxy regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission will permit1
When holders of at least 25% of the affected claims have assented to the plan,"1
it may be submitted to the I. C. C. for consideration under Section 2oa of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.18 The Commission is required to make certain specific findings,
such as that the railroad is not in need of reorganization, that its inability to meet its
maturities is reasonably expected to be temporary only, and that the plan meets
certain standards, e.g., is in the public interest, is feasible, financially advisable and
not likely to be followed by need of reorganization, does .not-provide for fixed
charges in excess of probable earnings, enables necessary future financing, allows for
adequate maintenance of the property, and is consistent with the proper performance
by the railroad of its functions as a common carrier.19 It is to be noted that the
Commission is not specifically required to find that the plan is "fair and equitable."
This means that although Chairman Eastman expressly requested that the legislation
clarify the Commission's duties with respect to determining the fairness of plans
presented under Section 2oa, the uncertainty continues. 20 As a result, the Commis-
sion has approved plans which seem dearly not to meet the standards of the Boyd21
and Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.F2 cases, even though this fact was pointed out
by dissenting Commissioners.2-
In the same letter in which he requested clarification of the Commission's duties
as regards the fairness of proposals presented for approval under Section 2oa, Chair-
man Eastman also pointed out that Commission consideration of such a plan is
inevitably affected by the fact that much time and money have already been spent
on the plan at the time of its submission to the Commission and that it has been
accepted by a substantial number of the interested parties.2 4
"s 571o). Chapter XV excludes from its provisions roads which are or have been within the past
ten years in equity receivership or S77 proceedings.
"'See S. E. C. Regulation X-s4 , as amended, Feb. 15, 1940, promulgated under Securities Exchange
Act, §14(a), 15 U. S. C. A. §78n(a) (Supp. 1939). S7100).
IS 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. S20. S 71 o(2).
"' See letter of Chairman Eastman to Senator Wheeler, Chairman, Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Senate Hearings, x86, 18g.
" Northern Pac. R. R. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
"'Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. io6 (1939).
" ommissioners Mahaffie and Eastman, Montana, W. & S. R. R. Financial Adjustment, Fin. Doe.
No. 12517 0939).
"'See Senate Hearings, 186 et seq. The statute recognizes the importanre of this influence and with
remarkable naivet6 admonishes both Commission and court to scrutinize the facts and make their findings
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Rather than relieving this element of pressure, Chapter XV enhances it, for ac-
ceptance of the plan by a minimum of 25% of the affected parties is made a pre-
requisite to Commission consideration 2 As a matter of fact, the managements have
frequently presented the plan to the Commission, only after an even larger per-
centage of assents has been received."6
The position of the Commission under Chapter XV is further impaired by limit-
ing its action to either approving or disapproving the plan as submitted with no
apparent authority to modify any of its provisions. 21 Added to this is the important
factual element that unless the Commission approves the plan the railroad involved
will undoubtedly be thrown into reorganization or receivership proceedings. While
a thorough-going reorganization may be precisely what the road needs, the I. C. C.
will be most unwilling to assume the responsibility for the initiatioh of such pro-
ceedings. This unwillingness has been displayed by the Commission on many occa-
sions, among them the opinion on the B. & 0. plan.28 After pointing out important
weaknesses in that plan, the Commission concluded that nevertheless it would give
its approval, stating that the only alternative open to the road, if approval were
withheld, was reorganization.
Before the Commission had acted on any plans under Chapter XV, the writer
suggested that, in view of the elements just discussed, it was most unlikely that any
Chapter XV plan would be rejected by the I. C. C.29 The Commission has no real
choice. It starts with an ambiguous statute, a plan on which much time and money
have been spent and which has been accepted by a substantial number of the in-
terested parties. It possesses a natural desire to avoid responsibility for precipitating
the financial reorganization of a private corporation and can do so only by approving
the plan as submitted, since it appears to have no authority to require any modifica-
"independently of the extent of acceptances of such plan and of any lack of opposition thereto." S§71o,
725(3). The court in addition is instructed to ignore the fact that the Commission has approved the plan
and has made findings similar to those to be made by the court. S725(3). A reading of any of the
Commission's decisions on Chapter XV plans, infra note 42, or the decision of the special court in the
B. & 0. case, supra note lo, will demonstrate the futility of any such provision.
"In this connection, cf. S77(d), providing for Commission and court consideration of any $77 plan
before submission to creditors; Chapter X, $176, prohibiting solicitation of assents to a Chapter X plan
until after its approval by the court.
The plan of the Montana, Wyoming & Southern IL R. had been accepted by holders of more than
three fourths of the bonds affected, I. C. C. Fin. Doc. No. 12517 (1939), that of the Chicago, Memphis
& Gulf R. R., by holders of more than 43% of the affected bonds, I. C. C. Fin. Doc. 12663 (1940),
and that of the Peoria & Eastern Ry., by holders of over 36% of the affected bonds, I. C. C. Fin. Doec. No.
12753 (1940).
"See §75o which refers merely to the issuance of an order authorizing the securities called for by
the plan. The I. C. C. did, however, condition approval of the Chicago, M. & G. R. R. plan upon the
inclusion of an additional agreement by the Illinois Central, the owner of all the road's stock, not to
terminate its lease with the Chicago, M. & G. before the extended maturity of the bonds affected by the
plan. See 1. C. C. Fin. Doc. No. x2663 (1940).
"230 I. C. C. 243 (1938). Another striking example is the case of the Chicago, M. & G. R. R. plan,
supra note 26, which the Commission approved despite an adverse recommendation by the examiner and
the dissent of Commissioners Eastman, Patterson, Mahaffie and Miller, the latter two constituting a
majority of the Finance Division which handled all Chapter XV plans.
"See Will, Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act.n American Adaptation of tie Fait Acconapli
(1940) 7 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 203, 209.
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tion thereof. Moreover, public servants are not impervious to outside pressure and
that provided by Chapter XV is great. As a result, all Chapter XV plans have been
approved by the Commission.
After receiving Commission approval the plan is next presented for final approval
to a special three-judge district court to be convened in the manner provided by Sec-
tion 266, as amended, of the Judicial Code. ° The plan may not be filed with this
court until it has been accepted by creditors holding more than two thirds of the
aggregate amount of affected claims including a majority of each affetted class"' and
may not be approved until accepted by holders of at least three fourths of all affected
claims, and three fourths of each dass. 2 Lacking any technical staff, the court faces
an even more difficult task than the I. C. C. The plan has the approval of a very
large percentage of the interested parties and has been approved by the Commission.
Finally, the amount of time and money expended on the plan is considerably greater
than at the earlier I. C. C. proceedings. All these factors combined result in a
pressure for approval which is virtually irresistible and represent a return to one of
the phases of equity receiverships which modern reorganization legislation has been
specifically designed to correct.33 It is under these circumstances that the ultimate
goal of the proceedings is reached, the order of the court approving the plan and
binding all dissenters to it.
While the discussion thus far has indicated that neither the 1. C. C. nor the
appropriate court is likely materially to amend or reject any of these management
plans, nothing has been said about the possibility of security holders acting in their
own behalf and either rejecting the plan or actively opposing it before the Commis-
sion or the court.
In this connection it may be pointed out that as a general proposition security
holders have neither the information nor the resources necessary to undertake effec-
tive individual action. In addition, as more fully discussed later, Chapter XV plans
are basically deferment plans having as their chief attraction the fact that no final
reduction in maturities is effected. Such plans appeal to the optimism of investors
and are not likely to arouse strong opposition. Finally, certain provisions of the
statute effectively discourage any organized opposition to the plan. The absence of
any provisions relating to independent committees plus the fact that fees are limited
to "amounts or consideration, directly or indirectly paid or to be paid by or for the
petitioner for expenses, etc: '3 4 militates strongly against the formation of such com-
mittees. While protective committees have often left much to be desired,35 the solu-
tion of that problem lies not in their abolition but in better regulation of their
$ S 713
.  
"' 5710(3)- " 5725(2).
" The S. E. C. in its report to the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce (Senate Hearings, 6I)
concluded: "In substance, the effect of the bill appears to be to limit the court to approving and confirming
so-called 'voluntary" or management plans" and continued by pointing out the similarities between the
Chapter XV procedure and the old "short receiversuips." See S. E. C. RvoiRTs, supra note 4, at 312
e seq. "5725(6) (italics added).
"See S. E. C. R.PoxTS, mpra note 4, esp. Pts. I and IL
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activities 36 Granting the management an outright monopoly to represent security-
holders in reorganization proceedings is antithetical to all the recent attempts made
to assure the freedom of committees from management domination and is a real
step backward.
The streamlined, high-pressure character of the procedure is also apparent from
other provisions of the statute. For example, while the court has jurisdiction to
enjoin any proceedings which might be inconsistent with or might interfere with
the effective execution of the plan, it is expressly prohibited from appointing a trus-
tee or receiver or otherwise controlling the operation or administration of the car-
rier involved 37 Further, the court is to be convened "immediately" following the
filing of the petition,as is "promptly" to enter its order approving or disapproving the
petition as filed,39 and is to hold the hearings on the plan "promptly: '40
The danger of falling into serious technical or legal errors in such a proceeding is
illustrated by a recent development in the B. & 0. case. The trustee under the in-
denture securing the B. & O.'s Five-Year Secured Notes, the only issue on which
interest was permanently reduced under the plan, recently filed a petition for instruc-
tions with respect to substantial dividends received and to be received by it on the
large blocks of Reading Company stock pledged to secure the Notes.4 A problem
arises because the original indenture which was not modified in this respect provides
that the trustee shall pay dividends received on the collateral to the B. & 0. only
when the Notes are not in default or when, among other things, the combined
capital and surplus of the Reading Company as shown by its books is $225,oooooo
or more. The book capital and surplus of the Reading have ranged between $233,-
ooo,ooo and $236,ooo,ooo over the period in which the $i,412,ooo in dividends now
held by the trustee was received, but included in the assets on which such capital
and surplus are based is a block of common stock of the Central Railroad of New
Jersey carried at its cost of approximately $24,ooo,ooo. Since the Jersey Central is in
Section 77 proceedings the value of the stock, if any, is greatly reduced. If the court
should refuse to construe its earlier order as authorizing the trustee to pay the
dividends to the B. & 0., it will probably be necessary to resolicit holders of the
Secured Notes for their assent to a modification of the indenture in that respect or
the B. & 0. will be unable to obtain these dividends which it sorely needs and the
equivalent of which it will be paying noteholders in annual interest. The noteholders,
however, may be unwilling to give up their advantage and the whole plan may be
jeopardized. It is unlikely that such a gap would have survived the extended nego.-
tiations attendant upon the formation of the typical reorganization plan. The in-
*ThLIis is the conclusion reached by the S. . C. (id. PL H, at 528 et seq.) and is reflected in the
provisions of Chapter X, i§209-213, relating to such committees.
875715. 5 §73.
a S714. S'720.
"'In re B. & 0. R. R. (D. Md., File No. 9294), Petition of the Trustee Under the Secured Note
Indenture for a Construction of Certain Provisions of the Decree Confirming the Plan (Order No. x6),
filed May 29, 1940.
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adequate consideration of the plan permitted by Chapter XV greatly increases the
possibility of such unfortunate situations.
THE PLANs
The discussion thus far has been directed principally to demonstrating that the
procedure authorized by Chapter XV is so geared as to make it highly unlikely that
any management plan will be materially affected by either the I. C. C. or the court.
Very little has been said about the character of the plans proposed under the pro-
cedure, an equally important aspect of the present analysis, for unless they are likely
to require amendment, the procedural weaknesses are of little consequence.
As of July i, i9-o, six plans had been filed under Chapter XV with the I. C. C. or
with the appropriate federal court. 42 While they vary because of differences in the
capital structures and financial conditions of the individual roads, certain general
characteristics may be pointed out. Most of these are common not only to the Chap-
ter XV plans but to any voluntary plan since they result from influences attendant
upon any attempt by the management of a corporation to negotiate directly with
security holders.
First, none of the six plans alters stock interests. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
any voluntary railroad plan will. This is true for several reasons. In the first place,
the plan is invariably promulgated by the management as a device for meeting im-
pending interest or principal maturities.43 The immediate hurdle therefore, does
not involve stock interests, and, since the management represents the stockholders,
thi.incentive is all against affecting their interests. In addition, because stockholders
possess no present claims which may be deferred or compromised, it is virtually im-
possible to devise a plan affecting them without not only doing so adversely but also
without offering any present inducement for their acceptance of the adverse treat-
ment. Unless unusually persuasive in terrorern arguments can be presented for their
agreement to such a plan it will bc impossible to obtain the substantial acceptance
necessary to effectuate any voluntary plan either apart from or under Chapter XV.
In the six plans under consideration not only are stock interests untouched, but the
claims of unsecured creditors also are not modified in any way.
Second, since the function of thl plan is to avoid receivership or Section 77 pro-
ceedings. it must provide some method of meeting the menacing maturities, and,
so that the solution may be more than temporary, must also provide for either can-
cellation, reduction, or deferment of other forthcoming maturities. In the absence
of unusual inducements, such as a present cash payment, however, secured creditors
"Wichita Falls a Southern R.. R. Financial Readjustment, 221 1. C. C. 585 (937); Lehigh Valley
R. I. and Subsidiaries Financial Readjustment, 230 1. C. C. 685 (1938); B. & 0. R. R. Financial
Readjustment, 230 1. C. C. 243 (1938); Montana, Wyoming & Southern R. . Financial Readjustment,
Fin. Doec. No. 12517 (1930); Chicago, Memphis & Gulf. R. R. Financial Readjustment, Fin. Doc. No.
12663 (1940); Peoria & Eastern R. R. Financial Readjustment, Fin. Doc. No. 12753 (1940).
"sChapter XV was apparently available only for management plans. See SS71o, 725 (6). Provisions
like the latter section make it virtually impossible for anyone but the management to undertake the
expense of a voluntary plan.
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are not likely to agree to cancellation or reduction of either interest or principal,
particularly when unsecured creditors and stockholders are not asked to make any
sacrifice of their interest in the corporation:
This means, as the six plans demonstrate, that -voluntary plans will be basically
deferment plans with reduction of either principal or interest being effected only
in unusual situations. Only two of the six plans affect more than a single issue and
both of these are almost exclusively deferment plans. 44 The B. & 0. plan, to con-
summate which Chapter XV was enacted, is typical of what may be expected in any
voluntary plan affecting more than a single class of securities of a large carrier. It
provides for both partial and complete deferments. Portions of interest on some
issues will continue as fixed charges and be paid currently while other portions, the
payment of which is made contingent upon earnings, will not be wiped out if unpaid
but merely deferred. In fact, the management strongly urged as a reason for ac-
ceptance of the plan that it called for no principal reductions and, with one minor
exception, no final reduction in interest but merely for a moratorium on the payment
of parts thereof.' 5
Two of the plans, involving single issues of somewhat smaller roads, do effect
reductions of principal and interest through the inducement of a present cash pay-
ment. 4 This is, of course, a very desirable accomplishment. It is limited in its
possibilities, however, to a relatively small number of roads, for it is to be noted
that both these carriers had single mortgages and both had or were able to obtain
the necessary cash, circumstances almost essential to the successful carrying out of
such a plan. Very few Class I railroads have single mortgages and few of those have
or could get sufficient cash to present the nicessary inducement.
That such plans can probably be effected without a special procedure is demon-
strated by the recent experience of the Boston and Maine Railroad in successfully
carrying out its plan without resort to Chapter XV. ' While the Boston and Maine
plan involved more than $oo,oooooo of securities, the larger of the two similar plans
referred to in the preceding paragraph, that of the Peoria & Eastern Railway Com-
pany affected only about $8,ooo,ooo of securities. The same singular factors of a
single mortgage and a source of cash were necessary to enable the carrying out of
the Boston and Maine plan, however.
"Those of the Lehigh Valley and the B. & 0. sSehate Hewings, 119.
"See Montana, W. & S. R. R. Financial Readjustment; and Peoria & E Ry. Financial Readjustment,
both supra note 42.
'"The Boston & Maine plan formulated with the assistance of the I. F. C. provided for holders of
the $1o3,833,ooo of bonds issued under the road's sole mortgage exchanging 5o% of their holdings
for new thirty-year 4% income bonds and taking either cash or new 20-year 4% first mortgage bonds
for the 5o% balance with the proviso that if more than about 25% of the bondholders elected to receive
cash, the cash payment would be reduced below 50% and the difference paid in first mortgage bonds.
Cash to meet the plan's requirements was lent the road by the R. F. C. which took no-year 4% first mot-
gage bonds therefor. The plan, which reduces fixed interest by almost $3,o00,0oo per annum and total
fixed and contingent interest by almost $sooo,ooo, had been accepted by holders of over 93% of the
outstanding bonds when it was declared effective. See Moony's RAn.rsoDn SxvawcE (1940) 779.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
One other element which will affect the character of voluntary plans of which
court approval is to be sought is the "fair plan" doctrine familiarly known as the
doctrine of the Boyd case,48 or, lately, the Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.4 9 case.
Since voluntary plans are-not likely to involve any reduction of stock interests, the
rule of absolute priorities enunciated by these cases will prohibit reductions in
principal or interest of secured claims without adequate consideration derefor. This
-means that there will be no straight reduction plans but that they will be either of
the straight deferment or cash-reduction-deferment types. That even these plans may
not meet the requirenicnts of the strict priorities doctrine is demonstrated by com-
paring the mo~t favorable, those involving a cash payment of part of the principal
and a deferment of the balance, with the orthodox contract principle under which
part payment in cash is not consideration for the extension of a matured claim.50
THE FirruR
We come now to the question of what legislative provision, if any, should be
made for future voluntary plans. With respect to straight deferment plans, the
writer is satisfied that as a general proposition there is at the present time no need
and no justification for a moratorium on railroad obligations which is precisely what
a deferment plan provides. A moratorium is justifiable only if the payments ex-
tended can reasonably be expected to be made under normal future conditions. This
raises the question of what the future reasonable expectations of the railroads arc.
In 1939, and there has been little change since then, roads operating nearly one
third of the country's mileage and having outstanding approximately one third of
the railroad funded debt were in either receivership or reorganization proceedings. 51
Another third of the roads are marginal producers who continually have difficulty
meeting their fixed charges often failing to do so. 2 The remaining third of the
roads are inreasonably strong financial condition.
It is apparent that only the middle group might find any use for a deferment
procedure, for the roads in the first group admittedly require reorganization and
those in the third consistently meet their fixed charges. The situation of the marginal
carriers is such that deferment is not likely to solve their present problems. A sam-
pling of 2i of these roads reveals that they have failed to meet their fixed charges
in almost half the years from i93o to 1937, and of the least successful ten an average
of less than four in each year have done so. Even in 1937, the best railroad year since
i93o, only three of these ten earned fixed charges and the most successful of the
three did so by only i.iio/r. Discouraging as the recent history of the marginal
"'Northern Pac. IL I. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (19T3).
"' Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. xo6 (1939). As to the effect of the Los Angeles
case on voluntary plans, see Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Iu implications
(940) 53 HtAv. L- Rv. 713, 747 et seq.See z Wi..asro, Cowrm.&crs (rev. ed. 1936) 5a2.
51See C.AY, WHAT SAL.L WE Do Aour THE RmLRoaD? ('939) 4.
92ibid.
"See The RehabRitation of Railroad Credit, Ry. BusINess Ass'., SEazs, t939, No. 7, P. a7 (Table
NO. 4).
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carriers is, the futility of deferring *charges which they are now unable to meet
bcomes more apparent upon an examination of their future. The earnings prospects
of these carriers, in the absence of unique considerations applicable to individual
roads, are no better than those of the railroads generally.
One of the surest, quickest ways to appraise the future of any industry as old as
the railroads is to examine the trend of its revenues and earnings. The revenue
trends of the railroad industry since i899 are very revealing. From that year through
xigo, railroad tonnage and revenues' advanced at a faster rate than business activity
generally. 54 Although gross railroad tonnage continued to increase from igao to
1929, it did so at a slower rate than that of general business expansion. The railroads
were not holding their own though the general prosperity of the period served to
obscure this trend. 5 This slowing down is further demonstrated by the fact that
from 1921 through 1936, while some new mileage was constructed, the entire railroad
system sustained a net loss through abandonment of 1o,279 miles."
The comparative decline of the railroads has continued at a surprisingly steady
rate. In 1937, the best railroad year since 193o , though the Federal Reserve Board
Index of Industrial Production averaged iio as against xII 'for i928, railroad freight
tonnage was 21.1% and freight revenue 28.2/ below 1928. Total revenues were
31.9% below 1928, indicating that passenger revenues had fallen off even more
sharply. 7 -
While the present improvement in general business conditions will make for in-
creased railroad revenues, there is nothing to indicate that the railroads will reverse
their twenty year declining trend. The use of trucks, buses, motor cars, airplanes,
pipe lines, inland water carriers, high transmission lines and other forms of trans-
portation continues to increase in part at the expense of the railroads. In the absence
of singular circumstances affecting individual carriers- or particular geographical
areas, it seems safe to predict that the relative position of the railroads will decline
until a new level of stability is reached.
Marginal producers in a declining industry are not likely to benefit by a mora-
torium. There are, with rare exception, no roads now unable to meet principal or
interest maturities, the business of which. is likely to improve in the next decade
sufficiently to enable them to consistently meet their present charges, in other words,
no roads of the type for whose benefit Chapter XV was ostensibly conceived.1 The
"In 1899, railroads as a whole originated 13.4 tons of freight and had revenues of $24.40 per Unt
of industrial production. By z92o these figures had increased to x6.5 tons and $53-45 respectively, the
greater rise in revenues being due to sharply higher freight rates. See MOODY'S MANUAL OF INVES-tUME5,
RmAt.oA Sacuamas (1939) a3.
"For a more detailed discussion of these trends, se Mooovys, op. cit. supra note 54, at 23 e: sq.
" PaW-var, I.-sMEwr SALVAGE i.x RmusoA RE ocANIZATo.NS (1938) 89.
"
T Moooy's, op. cit. supra note 54, at a4. There are also listed on p. a4 nine of the principal reasons
for the relative decline of the railroads.
"See the testimony of one of the authors of Chapter XV, Col. Henry W. Anderson, special counsel for
the B. & 0., in which he divides railroads into three financial categories, those having no financial troubles,
those having financial difficulties but not rzquiring reorganization, and those requiring drastic reorganiza-
tion, and commends Chapter XV to the middle group. Hearings of the Special Subcommittee on Bank-
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railroads which now find themselves in distress need substantial reductions in fixed
charges and a present moratorium merely defers the inevitable reorganization while
piling up large accumulations of deferred interest in the interim. As one railroad
observer has well said, "The railroads not only need more business-they need relief
from archaic capital structures. '5 9
In this respect a comparison between the capitalization of British and American
railroads is quite interesting. Whereas the fixed obligations of all American railroads
average 62% of their total capitalization and equity securities represent only 380/
thereof, the four largest British roads show 7.3% of their capitalization in share
capital with only 29.70/ in loan capital.60 This means that the British roads have a
substantial cushion of safety and may explain why financial failure is practically
unknown among them, while reorganization is a familiar event in many American
roads. Such a safety margin is particularly desirable in a declining industry.
It is frequently stated that on the basis of cost or reproduction value of their
property American railroads are not overcapitalized. While this is true, it is equally
true that on the basis of their earning capacity they are overcapitalized, and with
capital structures top-heavy with fixed obligations the earning capacity is far more
important than cost or reproduction value.61
Not only is reduction of fixed charges for roads now in distress necessary to pre-
vent recurrence of the present difficulties, but such a reduction would redound greatly
to the benefit of the roads and to their security holders in a variety of ways. It is
an interesting fact that while the operating revenues per mile of line of the financially
strong and the marginal roads for 1937 were approximately the same, the fixed
charges per dollar of revenue of the latter were from 14 to 31% greater. At the
same time, and this is quite important, the net available for fixed charges per dollar
of revenue of the strong roads was almost 2f% greater than that of the marginal
operators. While the revenue per mile of line of the two classes of carriers was
practically the same, the financially strong roads not only had substantially smaller
fixed charges, but also had lower operating costs per dollar of revenue and therefore
more available to meet their lower charges s .6
This indicates that, as might be anticipated, the financially straitened roads operate
less tfficiently. Much of. this operating inefficiency results from insufficient or in-
adequate equipment, old light rail, winding road-beds and manifold grade crossings,
all of which make for extraordinary maintenance and slower service. Still another
source of waste is antiquated shop facilities. Further, the necessity for meeting the
over-burdening fixed charges tends to induce deferment of desirable maintenance
resulting in depreciation of the property and greater expense in the future.
ruptcy and Reorganization bf the House Committee on the Iudkiary, on H. R 3704 and H. R. 5o7,
76th Cong, ist Sess. (1939) 22. "CAY, op. cir. upra note 51, at 5.
" BusswG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 7 et seq. Several counterbalancing factors which make a comparison
of British and American railroads reasonably trustworthy are discussed at p. 7.
6 See CLAY, op. Cii. supra note 51, at 42 ez seq.; The Rehabilitation of Railroad Credit, supra note 53.
"See id. at 6 (Table I).
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These considerations coupled with the declining character of the industry make
it apparent that roads now unable to meet their maturities will not find deferment
of these charges with no permanent reductions therein of any real benefit.
While there appears to be no rcal place for moratoria plans, there is a most useful
field for plans providing permanent reductions of principal and interest. While thus
far no reductions involving more than a single issue have been effected voluntarily,
it is conceivable that large-scale plans may be carried through without the extended
proceedings now characteristic of Section 77. The possibility that even a relatively-
few single or multiple issue reductions may be effected voluntarily justifies some form
of legislation providing for binding non-assenters to such a-plan.
Any such new legislation, however, should be available only for plans providing
substantial reductions of principal and interest maturities. In addition, the procedure
should provide essential safeguards not present in Chapter XV. Effective examina-
tion of the plan by both the I. C. C. and the court should be assured through the
elimination of the pressure elements of Chapter XV. An express prohibition, similar
to that in Chapter X, on the solicitation of assents to the plan before approval by
both the Commission and the court should be induded.P This is far more important
with respect to voluntary management plans than for the typical Chapter X plan
which is formulated only after careful negotiation among representatives of all classes
of security holders.
Finally, the I. C. C. should be specifically authorized to amend the plan, if neces-
sary, and be required to find that it is "fair and equitable."
While other desirable provisions will be apparent from the observations hereto-
fore made, these are essential: a limitation to plans providing for substantial reduc-
tions, provision for pressure-free consideration of them by both the Commission and
the court, authorization to the Commission to amend the plans, and finally, a re-
quirement that the I. C. C. as well as the court approve their fairness. While the num-
ber of plans which can be effected under such limitations and provisions is probably
small, no legislation for voluntary plans should be enacted without these basic pro-
tective measures, for an unsound plan rather than assisting the particular carrier
may result in the accumulation of an insurmountable debt burden which will make
the ultimate reductions the more drastic and painful and result in an aggregate loss
much greater than if the carrier were financially stabilized at the present time.6'
"'Chapter X, S176, i U. S. C. A. 5576 (1939).
SThis was pointed out by Commissioner Eastman as follows: s . . uch a plan only defers the
evil day and makes it worse when it finaly arrives." Hearings, supra note 58, at 83.
